From the EditorF

By Arezki Daoud – 4 October 2019: The Algerian political crisis is in its 33rd week with no sign of any of the protagonists standing down.  The standoff continues, with the military command intensifying its repression against members of civil society, while the Hirak movement (anti-government) is showing no interest in the military command’s roadmap based on a 12 December presidential election. The military command has secured the candidacy of several personalities. However, the candidacy of former prime ministers Ali Benflis and Abdelmadjid Tebboune announced last week poses a serious challenge to the regime’s credibility vis-à-vis the public considering that both men were former officials of the Bouteflika regime.  Benflis served as Bouteflika’s prime minister from 2000 to 2003, while Tebboune was prime minister in 2017.

In addition to the standoff between the people and the military command, the latter is still embroiled in a brutal clan warfare pitting him against powerful intelligence officers who are still loyal to the jailed intel chiefs Mediene and Tartag.  In an effort to eliminate their influence, General Gaid Salah, who is their primary target, appointed General Wassini Bouazza as head of domestic intelligence, largely due to his loyalty to Gaid Salah instead on any expertise on intelligence matters.  Indeed, General Bouazza has been serving as Director of Infrastructure at the Ministry of Defense, making him one of the least logical candidates for the post of Domestic Intel Chief.  His appointment has been marred with controversy, with opposition figures in Algeria and abroad accusing General Wassini of being an enabler of repression in his role as advisor to General Gaid Salah and impeding in making meaningful political progress.

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With lack of progress, tension has been steadily on the rise, and positions on both sides of the conflict have hardened.  Opposition figures have had a dominant control of the anti-government narrative on social media and on the Internet, despite efforts to oppose the “social revolution” from networks allegedly based in the UAE, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia.  On the ground, and in contrast, the security services have been arresting dozens of people in what ought to be considered arbitrary arrests. 

In between is a general population that is both worried and yet determined to see the end of the Bouteflika regime as a whole and its replacement with a civilian entity that has no ties to the former governing system.  The push toward an election on 12 December as imposed by the military is considered by the Hirak as entirely illegal and will continue to stir tension. Efforts by the military to organize elections are underway, but the Hirak movement has been undermining such efforts, in particular in the Kabylie region, east of the capital Algiers, where local elected officials insist that there will be no collaboration with the central authorities and no elections.

All eyes now are on the month of November, where tension is likely to reach its climax.  There are two potential scenarios forming. Either the elections are once again delayed and the crisis continues, or the military manages to impose an election outcome at any cost and Algeria will undoubtedly fall into a deeper crisis.  The consequences of such protracted crisis will extend beyond Algeria and could create another cycle of insecurity in the Mediterranean region.