Libya is back in the news again, and it is not good news. At the center of it all, once again, are the two types of power struggles we are witnessing. On the one hand, there is a permanent conflict between Libya’s rival governments, and on the other hand, there is an intense competition for influence involving foreign powers, who sponsor one rival government against the other.
With the world shifting its attention to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, things went a bit quiet in Libya for a while. But that quiet period allowed the eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar enough time to convince his patrons and supporters abroad to continue to lean on him, despite his failure to capture Tripoli. Haftar is now front and center in the Libyan security, political and economic landscape, reigniting a sense of instability that could last for a long period.
Haftar is imposing himself and his sons as the indispensable interlocutors. Everyone is talking to them, and on Haftar’s own territory in eastern Libya, giving him another layer of legitimacy that not only he does not deserve, but it is a “legitimacy” that he will use to further his own interests and those of his sponsors at the expanse of the Libyan people and the stability in the region. We’ve seen VIPs and political and military leaders knock at his door, from Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to the Commander of US AFRICOM, Michael Langley, even though Haftar has been leaning on the Russians and their mercenaries of the Wagner Group to wage his wars. We have to admit that Haftar is a clever operative. One who gets to shake hands with both the perpetual foes, the Russians and the Americans. Despite failure after failure, he manages to convince foreign capitals to keep sponsoring him, and what’s extraordinary is that many of these foreign parties compete against one another, they may even be in a state of war, and yet they all listen to Marshall Haftar as if there is no alternative.
One of his latest disruptive moves was to send his militia known as the Libyan National Army (LNA) to the southwest of the country, along the borders with Chad and Algeria, igniting significant concern about his intentions. For Haftar, sending fighters to the southwest is a “necessary step to secure Libya’s borders and bolster national security.” In this context, his argument is that the instability in the Sahel, specifically in neighboring Niger and Chad, justifies the sending of troops there. However, the timing and scale of these movements have raised alarms about potential underlying motives. Many see Haftar’s deployment of troops to the southwest, particularly in strategically vital areas such as Sabha, Ubari, and the Fezzan region, as a way to control a geographical zone rich in natural resources, including oil and gas.
A rival to the Haftar political system, the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), which has a greater level of legitimacy given that it is recognized by the United Nations, insists that Haftar’s actions could destabilize the fragile ceasefire and lead to renewed conflict. The GNU echoes the positions taken by the United Nations and other international bodies, who believe that such a military buildup could escalate tensions and sabotage efforts to unify the Libyan military. The GNU also feels that Tripoli could be militarily squeezed between the Haftar forces in the east and the south, hence creating a new armed conflict.
Beyond what the GNU and the UN feel, Haftar’s actions in the southwest could have significant implications on the traditional security structure of the region, which relies heavily on tribal leaders and their ability to thwart security threats. With Haftar seeking to reorganize the way local armed groups operate and their command structures, he could ignite a new cycle of communal tension that could further destabilize the region.
In another crisis rooted in this broader power struggle between the GNU led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh and ‘Field Marshal’ Khalifa Haftar’s system, is the tense standoff that is taking place over the control of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), which manages the country’s large oil revenues.
Earlier last month, the offices of the CBL in Tripoli were besieged by armed groups attempting to oust its long-time governor, Sadiq al-Kabir. This was followed by the kidnapping of a senior bank official, leading the bank to suspend its operations due to security concerns. As a result, the suspension of the bank’s activities has had a significant impact on Libya’s economy and sent jitters to the global oil market. While it may be tempting to blame Haftar for the crisis, this time observers tend to blame PM Dbeibeh instead, arguing that the GNU is trying to consolidate control over key institutions like the CBL, further straining relations with Haftar’s forces.
In response, Khalifa Haftar’s forces in eastern Libya shut down oil exports, prompting the global oil markets to react with significant concern. Oil prices experienced a slight increase following the announcement of the shutdown, and the impact is not just a short-term problem. Some oil analysts have noted that the situation in Libya could be a “wild card” in the oil markets in 2025.
So as you can see, not all is well in Libya. As we predicted at the end of last year, there is no appetite among the global powers to see the end of the Libyan crisis. The fact that it has gone from super violent to a crisis that does not make news headlines, that’s good enough progress. But the fact that Khalifa Haftar and his sons continue to expand their power base, Libya will remain a major source of instability in the region and beyond, including into the Sahel and possibly into West Africa.
