There have been more chatter and speculations about the activities of Russia’s mercenaries, formerly known as the Wagner Group, now reportedly called the Afrika Corps in the Sahel. It is unclear if the name “Afrika Corps” is official, but if so, it certainly confirms that the Russian outfit’s primary focus is indeed on Africa, likely as an arm of Moscow’s Africa policy. For the purpose of this analysis, I will continue using the name Wagner. The Wagner gang is active in many Sahelian regions. We have been hearing that a number of its mercenaries withdrew from Burkina Faso to go back to Russia to counter the ongoing Ukrainian offensive.
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In neighboring Mali, Wagner is highly active. Its operations there have primarily targeted civilians and Tuareg militants in the north. Wagner’s activities in Mali are punitive in nature, inflicting misery on unprotected civilians. Check out the video below for a tiny sample of their arsenal of torment. There are also reports that they may have crossed the Mali-Mauritania border while pursuing Tuaregs, targeting locals within Mauritania. In areas where jihadists operate, Wagner does little to counter these terror groups. They allow Islamist militants to operate freely because they know engaging them would mean facing battle-hardened fighters eager to challenge the Russians. There is no chance of the jihadists cooperating with Wagner, as many of them are Tuaregs themselves.
How successful is Wagner in Mali? So far, many indications suggest that their involvement has not been going well. They have made little impact on the jihadist insurgency because their primary focus is on the Tuaregs. For context, the Tuaregs are an ethnic group based in northern Mali and in neighboring countries, who have long advocating for the transformation of Mali into a federal state. They argue that the government, based in the southern capital of Bamako, has always neglected them and deprived the impoverished north of resources. They believe autonomy within a federal model would allow northern provinces and other regions to gain greater freedom to manage their own affairs without interference from the central government.
These demands have long been rejected by Bamako, under the influence of France, which has never tolerated the idea of autonomous regions where it maintains post-colonial influence. However, there had been a truce between the Tuaregs and the Malian central government since 2015, in a political process brokered by Algeria. The recent takeover of power in Bamako by a military junta resulted in the expulsion of the French military, the UN, and other foreign institutions that had provided some protection to the Touaregs in the north. Subsequently, the junta also withdrew from the Algiers Accords, effectively reigniting the conflict with the Touaregs. To make matters worse, Bamako invited Russia’s Wagner Group to play a crucial role in countering the Touaregs demand for autonomy. Wagner has since been accused of committing war crimes with the Malian government’s contribution.
Judging by the recent clashes that took place in Tinzwouatin, northern Mali, which claimed the lives of dozens of Russian fighters, the situation for Wagner appears uncertain, and even grim. Their operations in Mali could end in failure, similar to what happened to them in Mozambique. In 2019, Wagner was contracted by the Mozambican government to combat the insurgency in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, but their efforts were widely regarded as a failure. In Mozambique, Wagner fighters struggled to operate in the dense Southern African terrain and were no match for the Al-Shabab fighters. Wagner was forced to withdraw prematurely after suffering heavy losses.
In Mali, the terrain is harsh in a different way. Northern Mali is an unforgiving environment for Russian fighters unaccustomed to extreme heat, sandstorms, and the highly skilled Touareg fighters. In Mozambique, Wagner’s poor coordination and communications with the local military led to confusion and setbacks. Similarly, in Mali, Malian soldiers reportedly resent the Russian fighters, feeling subordinated to them. There is no respect for the Russian mercenaries.
Wagner suffered significant losses in Mozambique, often becoming sitting ducks for ambushes and attacks. After their withdrawal, Wagner was replaced by South African mercenaries from the Dyck Advisory Group, and Mozambique also received military assistance from Rwanda. This history suggests that Wagner’s scorched-earth tactics in Mali are likely to fail, placing the ruling junta in a difficult position.
For now, sources within the Malian opposition suggest that Wagner’s defeat in Tinzwatin is creating tensions within the junta leadership in Bamako. Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara benefits from personal protection provided by Wagner, while junta leader Assimi Goita is protected by Turkish mercenaries from the SADAT Group. Reports suggest the two men are suspicious of each other, and more alarmingly, both Moscow and Ankara are reportedly concerned about the worsening situation in Mali and may consider scaling back their involvement there. Malian opposition figure Mohamed Ag Ahmedou, who leads an interim government in exile called the Civil Transition Government of Mali, indicated that Bamako has signaled a willingness to negotiate a truce as they are concerned about their own safety. They may seek a settlement to the crisis while the Russians reassess their losses and the Turks avoid further escalation. Although Bamako denies this, the recent defeat in the north may be the catalyst for forthcoming changes.
