Nigeria: More than 160 people killed in Muslim communities in Kwara StateF

Nigeria’s Woro massacre in early February 2026 was a large‑scale attack on two mainly Muslim farming communities that left Muslim and Christian civilians dead, including adults and children, community leaders, and people living on the economic margins. Local leaders and human rights monitors estimate that roughly 90–95% of those killed were Muslims and about 5–10% were Christians, figures drawn from village head testimonies and burial records. Casualty counts vary across official and humanitarian sources, but reporting converges on more than 160 people killed, with the final toll likely to be higher as more bodies are found and identified.

Woro and nearby Nuku lie in Kaiama Local Government Area of Kwara State in western Nigeria, far from the northeastern heartlands usually associated with Boko Haram and other jihadist groups. They are small, largely agrarian settlements where families grow crops such as yams, maize, and millet and trade livestock and basic goods in local markets. Residents and local leaders describe communities that had already been living under mounting pressure from armed extremists, who circulated letters and messages urging villagers to accept a rigid interpretation of Islam, reject the Nigerian state, and allow them to preach and establish their own rules. Villagers say they repeatedly refused, insisting on their own religious practice and their loyalty to state authorities.

Survivor testimonies and local accounts portray the victims as ordinary civilians caught in an extremely violent reprisal for that refusal. Farmers returning from their fields, market traders, children walking home from school, teachers, and religious figures were among those shot at close range, attacked with knives, or trapped in homes and shops that were set on fire. Community leaders report that the chief imam of Woro, a school principal, and a headmistress were killed alongside schoolchildren, depriving the villages of key religious and educational figures in a single day. Relatives of the traditional ruler, often referred to locally as the village head or emir, are also reported among the dead, including young adults who were studying and working outside the village and had returned to visit family.

Women and low‑income residents appear to have been particularly vulnerable. Witnesses describe women who ran small businesses or farmed family plots being killed near their homes or at roadside stalls. Elderly residents and people with limited mobility often could not flee when the attackers arrived, and some died in their houses as buildings were set ablaze. Local burial efforts, as reported by journalists and advocacy groups on the ground, indicate that Muslim victims were laid to rest in a large communal grave, while Christian victims were buried according to their communities’ practices, either in nearby villages or in churchyards in the wider area. These same sources place Christian victims at roughly 5–10% of the total, consistent with the area’s religious makeup. All of these figures remain provisional, and community leaders caution that they are still discovering bodies in surrounding farmland and bush.

The attack also involved abductions, further blurring the line between those killed and those still missing. Residents say that dozens of people, many of them women and children, were seized and taken away on motorcycles and in stolen vehicles. Some of those abducted are believed to be relatives of local leaders, while others were selected simply because they were caught in the attackers’ path. Families interviewed after the massacre describe the anguish of burying loved ones while not knowing whether missing relatives are alive, held for ransom, or at risk of forced recruitment or abuse. The number of abductees is still being verified, and the situation remains fluid as negotiations, rescue efforts, and further attacks in the wider region evolve.

Although no group has formally claimed responsibility, Nigerian officials and independent analysts broadly agree that the attackers are part of a jihadist network linked to Boko Haram, the Islamic State, or allied factions that have expanded operations into northwestern and central Nigeria. Residents report that, before the killings, the same actors had requested permission to preach in the villages and impose their version of Islamic law. When community leaders and residents refused, citing their own religious traditions and their commitment to the Nigerian state, the threats escalated into the coordinated assault. The fact that most victims were Muslims, with Christians also among the dead, underscores that this was not simply an attack by one religious community on another, but an attempt to punish communities that rejected an extremist project and to send a message to other rural populations facing similar pressure.

In the aftermath, Woro and Nuku have been transformed. Large parts of both villages are now burned out, with charred houses, collapsed roofs, and destroyed shops marking the path of the attackers. Thousands of residents have fled to larger towns, to displacement sites, or to stay with relatives elsewhere in Kwara and neighboring states. Those who remain are often the poorest families, older people, and individuals who lack the resources to relocate, and they are now living with deep trauma, disrupted schooling for their children, and acute fears of further violence. Local and national authorities have announced new security deployments and a dedicated military operation in the wider area, while humanitarian groups warn that the survivors urgently need protection, medical care, psychosocial support, and help rebuilding their livelihoods.