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The Sahel is now clearly the next big event in Africa’s geopolitics. After the complete destruction of Libya, the same foreign powers that paid for the killing of a nation are now shifting their attention to the Sahel, establishing the bases of another sizeable crisis that will take decades to extinguish.  The Sahel has long been destabilized, at least in recent history. Its post-colonial era has been still dominated by France, despite the Sahelian nations being independent on paper. There have been no improvements for the region, but a fast worsening of the political, social, environmental, and economic conditions.

While the military juntas in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, that ousted presidents who were under the control of France, may have received a high degree of popular support, they are now facing a complex geopolitical context that they cannot control, and which promises more troubles ahead.  The dynamics of the post coups are extremely complex. Here are some areas to watch that will likely make the region more explosive than ever before:

1. The Sahel juntas have abruptly expelled France from the region. If there is one country that one must be worried about in this environment is France. Paris has essentially been humiliated but it has assets in the region that no other foreign power can match. France is not likely to give up the Sahel and abandon its influence there after centuries of an active presence. Three juntas with no experience, financial resources or diplomatic skills are no match to the expertise of France in the region. I do not mean to overestimate France, yet not only it has unique historical ties and economic interests, but it also has strong networks and deep connections of influence, a strong economic grip on the region, and unmatched resources that no one should consider its military withdrawal from the region as the final thing. More importantly, though, it has a grudge against junta leaders and that’s where the concern is. France’s humiliation is not just about being evicted from the Sahel, but also about being replaced by Russia and the Wagner mercenaries.  So expect both overt and covert activities from France meant to make the juntas pay a price for their actions against it.

2. The Sahel juntas getting the Russians involved in domestic affairs is a problem. While no one should also underestimate Russia and its capabilities, the Sahel is not a region it knows. Yes, Russia can expand its influence in a number of ways, including selling weapons, assisting the juntas with the use of the Wagner Group or assisting in extracting minerals. But while violence and brute force as used by the Wagner Group may be effective tactics on the short term to silence, and indeed punish the northern populations for wanting autonomy, the Touaregs are going nowhere and war against them in northern Mali, means war against their brethren in neighboring countries. The Russians’ brute force tactics may soon face limitations when dealing with insurgencies like those of the Touaregs. The Touregs from outside Mali will come from Niger, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and they will bring with them battle-hardened Jihadists given that now they have two common enemies: the Malian military and the Russian mercenaries. Over the next weeks and months, we are likely to read press releases and communiques praising the gains of the Malian military and their Russian contractors and on how victorious they are in north Mali. But I expect the Touaregs will regroup and bring help from their peers to fight back. This will take months, even years, to sort out and so expect more troubles ahead.

3. The humiliation of Algeria is another huge problem for the Sahel, mostly for Mali. Mali has just announced its withdrawal from the Algiers Agreement. The agreement was the foundation of a peace deal between Bamako and the northern Touaregs, negotiated by Algiers and signed in 2015. The withdrawal from the agreement followed a series of allegations made by the Malian junta against Algeria on all sorts of issues, including meddling in domestic affairs. The problem here is that Mali and Algeria share nearly a 1,400 kilometer (850 miles) border and Algeria has microscopic visibility on northern Mali that inevitably makes it an important player in Mali politics. Algeria’s intelligence services are well entrenched in north Mali given the presence of terror groups that were active in Algeria in 1990s and migrated to the Sahel afterwards. Many of the Al Qaeda leaders in the Sahel are Algerians, and Algeria has always had strong ties with all Touareg subgroups all over the Sahel. Like France, if not more, Algeria is an inevitable actor in the Sahel context.

4. So as the problems from its northern regions are frightening enough, the Sahel is also on a collision course with its southern and western neighbors. As I predicted in recent analyses and podcasts, this past weekend, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have decided to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), following a prolonged disagreement over ECOWAS’s rejection of military rule in with its sub-region. The three Sahelian countries accuse the regional group of deviating from the ideals of its founding fathers and Pan-Africanism after nearly five decades of existence. This move is bound to create new frictions with the likes of African powerhouse Nigeria on the southern flank of the Sahel. This is another front that Sahel juntas opened, and which can also cost them dearly. There is no doubt that Sahel governments have the right and obligation to enhance their sovereignty, it is another thing to do with in ways that the region is isolated through these self-inflicted wounds.

5. The new players, coming from Libya: While it is often easy to blame Russia for more destabilization of the Sahel, it is fair to point the finger to other players as perhaps being even more devious in this geopolitical game. Virtually everyone who had their fingers inside the Libyan pot, so to speak, are now in the Sahel. Attempting to mediate between Algeria and Mali to ease their diplomatic tension is Qatar. Qatar is doing so because it wants to block the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from increasing its influence in the Sahel. The UAE is often cited as wanting an escalation of trouble in the region, and just as it is accused of employing the Wagner Group in Sudan, it is also accused of using Wagner in the Sahel. Morocco also loves the drama Algeria finds itself. Given the animosity that exists between the two Maghreb nations, there is no doubt that Morocco is working to further undermine the Algerian influence in the Sahel. Morocco is reportedly offering a sort of preferential relationship deal with Mali if it disconnects itself from Algeria.  The Malian junta appears eager to follow that path. Meanwhile, lethal drones are everywhere, and Turkey is a key supplier to the region, with clear intentions on upping its influence there.

6. So should we expect the Libya scenario to repeat itself in the Sahel? Well, the foreign forces that have been sponsoring instability in Libya are already in the Sahel. There are some interesting alliances forming or likely to form in the future, like we see Algeria and France working to regain control of the situation. We see some tension between Algeria and its weapons supplier Russia over Wagner contracting on behalf of the UAE.  We see the possibility of the Algeria/France alliance coalescing with Nigeria to contain the actions of the juntas. We also see Morocco and the UAE work together to prevent a return to the old days.

Obviously, the weakest links in this development are clearly the Sahelian juntas. Relatively young, poorly educated on diplomacy and strategy, with nations suffering from lack of financial resources, the junta leaders are being played before our eyes. A little bit of money from here and there can sway their positions. And that’s what the foreign meddlers are doing. The ultimate loss, though, is for the Sahelian population. Sadly, they will remain in a state of utter instability for decades to come.