Analysis by Alessandro Bruno: No country more than Italy – which faces both the prospect of another migrant wave and economic disaster – has a greater incentive to help mitigate, if not fully resolve, the crisis. Italy sees itself forced to react if it wants to retain a modicum of influence in the Mediterranean region.
During the recent One Belt Road summit in Beijing, Italy’s prime minister, Giuseppe Conte asked Russian President Vladimir Putin for help in resolving the Libyan crisis. Italy needs international help because its problems in Libya don’t just come from Gen. Haftar, but Its EU fellow member France is a rival. Moreover, since President Trump called General Haftar, it seems Washington is no longer willing to back Fayez al-Sarraj and the Government of National Accord (GNA). It’s evident that Paris – with which Tripoli has cut diplomatic relations – and Washington are now backing Haftar. The problem seems to be that al-Sarraj, backed by the UN though he may be, is close to the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, al-Sarraj displeases Saudi Arabia and likeminded regional powers, including Egypt, the UAE and the United States of course. And U.S. troops stationed in Tripoli simply left, the moment that Haftar’s troops started to approach Tripoli at the beginning of April. Russia has also maintained good relations with Haftar, and many analysts as well saw Haftar, as head of the sole entity resembling an army, as a potential unifying force, able to control the militias and tribes and restore unity between the Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.
But Italy has invested in al-Sarraj. So much so that militias and other internal enemies (the self-proclaimed prime minister Khalifa Gwell for example) accused the head of the GNA of having arrived to Tripoli aboard an Italian Navy frigate in March 2016. Yet, the GNA represents a problem for Italy as well now. Rome has become ever more isolated in Libya.
Russia, though one of the presumed backers of Haftar, represents Italy’s last hope to regain some influence – if not outright resolve the situation – in Libya. The North African country has been disconnected since 2011. Expectations for a prompt reunification should be realistic; there is no simple solution. But an eventual solution might be found if Italy works together with Russia – which has relations with both al-Sarraj and Haftar – and if France doesn’t get in the way. The main obstacle comes from wider geopolitics. Turkey and Qatar are openly backing al-Sarraj and all other Muslim Brotherhood-related governments and political parties in the Middle East and North Africa. While the United States and other NATO allies – France for example – have focused on selling weapons to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Italy has sold ships and aircraft to Qatar (where it happens Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, is residing). Who, other than Russia, maintains good relations with all players in the Middle East (including Saudi Arabia, which backed several of the militias in Syria, against which Russia fought directly)?
With al-Sarraj having lost the backing of the United States, Italy can act as a bridge using its historic close ties to Moscow to shift Russia’s stance away from Haftar and more in favor of a political solution to stop the escalation of a war, which has no chance of ending soon. Italy’s energy giant ENI is the dominant oil and gas player in Libya. It also has close ties to Russia, having been the first to import Russian gas during the Soviet era. And Russia would
The Author: Mr. Bruno is MEA Risk Senior Vice President and Global Analyst. Based in Toronto, Mr. Bruno provides advisory and consulting services on global geopolitics. He is a frequent contributor to international media, from the BBC and CBC, to CTV and RT. He is also Editor at The North Africa Journal.
see Italy as the lever through which to sideline American isolation, deepening relations with a key NATO member. If Haftar has achieved anything with his military campaign it is to have sidelined the Ghadames summit, which would have imposed a political solution. Italy, through Russia, is in a position to reset Libya on a path of reconciliation rather than military conquest by one side over the other. Likewise, the stabilizing effect in Libya would also ease tensions in the rest of North Africa. As for Qatar and Russia, despite differences over Syria, Doha has invested billions of dollars in the Russian economy and recently signed a $11.5 billion deal to purchase about one fifth of Russia’s state-owned oil company Rosneft. The law of unintended consequences – or, better, geopolitical miscalculations – has seen Moscow and Doha establishing ever improving relations since Saudi Arabia, with the apparent assent from Washington, instituted a virtual blockade of Qatar in 2017. Haftar’s biggest backers, meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt (and Bahrain) were quick to join the Saudi undiplomatic effort.
Russia has consistently called for an end to the economic blockade and talks to resolve the crisis.
President Putin made this clear to Crown Prince Mohammed bin-Salman (aka ‘MBS’) when the heir to the throne in Riyadh visited Moscow for the FIFA world cup. Russia itself would like to receive Qatar’s backing for initiatives to favor reconciliation in Syria. And if Turkey has signed orders for the Russian made S-400 missile defense system – also pondering the acquisition of Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jets to replace the F-35’s, which Trump will no longer allow Ankara to buy – the Al-Thani emirs in Doha have their eyes on the Su-35 jet.
If Russia and Qatar are improving relations, Italy has decided to make Qatar its most important partner in the Gulf. Trade between Italy and Qatar has risen sharply. In 2018 Italian exports to the Gulf country exceeded a billion euros. That does not look like much, but it represents an increase of 17.3% over 2017. Meanwhile, Italy imported more liquid natural gas from Doha – ironically, this was to limit reliance on Russian gas. Italy recently unveiled a new embassy in Doha and Prime Minister Conte was there for the inauguration. He was also there to discuss Libya and the need to stabilize the country, underlining the impetus with which Rome wants to address the instability in the North African country, signing more deals to sell military equipment made by Leonardo and Fincantieri.
Having established that there exist significant diplomatic interests at play between Italy, Libya, Qatar and Russia, what could Moscow do? Moscow, in fact, unlike Washington takes fewer risks in diplomatic games. It prefers to play various cards, rather than placing it all on a single bet. If Putin and Lavrov have met Haftar at the Kremlin, the Russians have also hosted Prime Minister al-Serraj. They have even met ‘delegates’ from the formidable Misurata militia, which has almost singlehandedly defended and counterattacked Haftar’s forces in Tripoli’s southern suburbs since Haftar’s offensive began. Moreover, Moscow has also maintained contacts with Saif ul-Islam al-Qadhafi, the former Brother Leader’s son, captured and held by rebels until 2017, when he was released. And Saif ul-Islam was planning to run in the next election. Italy would not object – and probably few Libyans – if Saif ul-Islam was to win an election that ensured a greater degree of stability than the current Haftar-Serraj duopoly. Moscow’s interests in Libya are economic (wheat, oil, gas and mineral exploration – rare earths foe example, necessary for various so-called clean energy technologies, which the French have been allegedly searching in the southern Libyan desert). But Moscow’s interests are even more diplomatic. After Tartous in Syria, the Russians would appreciate having another base in the Mediterranean. There’s also an old plan to build a high-speed railway from Tripoli to Benghazi, which the Russians were discussing during the period of the Jamahiriya. It too needs stability to accomplish.
