Sudan’s army is expanding its position in the central part of the country as its civil war against the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, enters another critical phase. Recent fighting in North Kordofan has given the army control of additional territory and key roads, while also exposing the wider challenges facing a country where war has damaged infrastructure, disrupted farming and fractured local authority.
Sudan, a country in northeastern Africa, bordering Egypt, has been at war since April 2023. The conflict began as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, a powerful paramilitary force led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti. What began in the capital, Khartoum, rapidly spread across the country.
The army has generally retained influence in the east, north and parts of central Sudan. The RSF has established its strongest position in much of western Sudan, particularly Darfur, and has fought for control of routes through Kordofan, the wide region between Khartoum and Darfur.
North Kordofan is a strategic location because it contains El Obeid, a major commercial center and transportation hub. Roads through the region connect Sudan’s central population centers to Darfur in the west. Whoever controls these routes can move troops, weapons, fuel, commercial goods and humanitarian aid.
Reporting on the ground suggests that the army recently captured Jebel al-Dair, near the town of al-Rahad, strengthening its position in North Kordofan. The army has also reopened the Export Road, a route connecting Omdurman, near Khartoum, through Bara and into Kordofan. The gains give the army control of six of North Kordofan’s eight localities.
The military objective appears to be a push farther west. The RSF is reinforcing positions in El Nuhud, a city in West Kordofan, while the army has intensified airstrikes against RSF positions across the broader Kordofan theater. The army’s approach appears to rely on air power and gradual pressure before any major ground campaign toward West Kordofan or Darfur.
A change in control in Kordofan would be important, but it would not end the war. The RSF remains entrenched in Darfur, where it has built political, military and economic networks over many years. The group also continues to have the ability to launch attacks, disrupt roads and threaten civilian areas far from the front line.
The conflict is not limited to the army and the RSF. In South Kordofan, a separate confrontation has emerged around Kauda, the main stronghold of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu. That movement has fought Sudanese governments for decades and controls areas near the border with South Sudan.
The recent fighting in Kauda reportedly involves local members of the Otoro community and the SPLM-N. The dispute is rooted in questions of land, community representation and local security. It illustrates a broader problem in Sudan: national war often overlaps with longstanding local conflicts over resources, identity and political power.
The war is also worsening Sudan’s infrastructure crisis. The national electricity grid has suffered repeated breakdowns, including three widespread failures in one week. Reports also link the latest problems to transmission infrastructure connected to the Merowe Dam, one of Sudan’s most important electricity sources.
Sudan’s power system was already fragile before the war. Fighting has damaged facilities, disrupted maintenance and displaced technical staff. The destruction of the national grid-control center in Khartoum has made the system harder to manage. Engineers cited in various media reports said a fault in one part of the network can now trigger much broader outages because the remaining system cannot isolate failures effectively. For civilians, blackouts affect hospitals, water supplies, communications, small businesses and food storage.
They also threaten farming. This is especially important because Sudan’s food supply is under growing pressure. Agriculture in Darfur and Kordofan has been damaged by fighting, displacement and insecurity. That places greater importance on production in northern and eastern Sudan, where many farms depend on electric pumps for irrigation.
If power failures prevent farmers from pumping water, maintaining irrigation equipment or processing crops, Sudan could lose production in areas expected to offset losses elsewhere. Farmers may be forced to depend on diesel generators, which are expensive and difficult to operate during wartime shortages.
Sources also points to risk along Sudan’s eastern border with Ethiopia. Gedaref state, one of Sudan’s major agricultural areas, lies near Ethiopia and produces sorghum, sesame, millet and other crops. Renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region could disrupt cross-border trade, restrict access to farms, delay agricultural supplies and increase insecurity at a sensitive point in Sudan’s war.
The immediate military picture emerging from Sudan is therefore mixed. The Sudanese army appears to be improving its position in North Kordofan, gaining routes that could support a push westward. But military advances do not repair power lines, restore agriculture, resolve local land disputes or provide security for displaced families.
Sudan’s civil war is resulting in the total destruction of the country’s critical infrastructure, from roads, electricity, and irrigation, to markets and local administration. The army’s gains in Kordofan may alter the direction of the fighting. Whether they can lead to a more stable Sudan will depend on what happens far beyond the battlefield.
