Spanish media commentary on the Pegasus episode involving Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez intensified this week (February 12, 2026), after a detailed account by The Objective described how Moroccan intelligence allegedly exploited Sánchez’s May 2021 trip to Ceuta and Melilla to compromise his phone, and as Outono/Elentir amplified the episode by framing it as politically consequential for Spain’s near term.
According to ‘The Objective’, intelligence sources told the outlet that Morocco used a “window of opportunity” during the Ceuta visit to identify and isolate the presidential handset via an IMSI-catcher, a device that can impersonate cell towers and collect mobile identifiers, enabling targeted interception. The report places key activity around May 18–19, 2021, describing a sequence in which the alleged infection occurred on May 18 and the data extraction occurred on May 19, 2021.
‘The Objective’ adds that the trip’s itinerary, including time at the El Tarajal border area and a helicopter flyover, created multiple moments where the phone’s presence could be correlated across locations, which sources said helped confirm the identity of the terminals in use. The outlet describes the suspected technique as consistent with a “zero-click” approach, meaning compromise without the user clicking a link, and ties that claim to the operational advantage of using IMSI-catcher style equipment first to identify and shape the technical environment for an exploit.
In parallel, Outono/Elentir recaps the broader public timeline: Spain’s government acknowledged in May 2022 that Sánchez’s phone was targeted in May 2021 and that large volumes of data were extracted using Pegasus, and it notes that a European Parliament inquiry later identified Morocco as responsible, as summarized by the outlet while linking to Spanish reporting.
Where The Objective focuses on alleged tradecraft and chronology, Outono/Elentir focuses on domestic political interpretation, arguing that the unresolved question of what was taken, and the lack of official public clarity, leaves Spain exposed to continuing speculation about leverage, decision-making, and the political consequences that follow from uncertainty at the top of government. The outlet explicitly points readers back to The Objective as the catalyst for the renewed attention on the Ceuta trip details.
All in all, the two pieces reinforce a long-running tension in how Morocco is perceived in parts of Spain’s political and security debate, not only as a neighbor and economic partner, but as a state seen as willing to use leverage, pressure tactics, and intelligence tools to shape outcomes on issues tied to Ceuta and Melilla, migration management, and Western Sahara. When allegations of espionage sit alongside memories of the May 2021 border crisis in Ceuta, they tend to harden public suspicions that Spain faces an asymmetric relationship where Rabat can create costs quickly, while Madrid struggles to respond with equal speed or transparency. The parallel deepening of Morocco’s security and defense links with Israel adds another layer to that perception for some Spanish observers, because it raises questions about whether new capabilities, training, or systems could accelerate Morocco’s intelligence and military modernization, even when the specific facts and operational details in any given case remain unproven publicly.
