Libya has Khalifa Haftar, Sudan has its own ruthless warlord, Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo—better known as Hemedti. Like Haftar, Hemedti rose to power through brutal tactics, commanding paramilitary forces responsible for atrocities and exerting fierce control over territory, resources, and political processes. Both men run their operations like personal militias, often acting outside conventional state structures and regularly shaping national events through violence and intimidation.
Operating in similar ways, Haftar and Hemedti (H&H) each rely on support from powerful foreign backers, notably the United Arab Emirates and other regional allies. These connections have given them access to money, weapons, and diplomatic leverage, enabling their rise and their ability to challenge or destabilize national governments. Their reliance on mercenary networks, transactional alliances, and external funding has made them central figures in North Africa’s ongoing crises, with their influence fueled by shared methods and mutual patrons. Below is a profile of Hemedti written by Leslie Varenne for MondAfrique.
By Leslie Varenne for MondAfrique: Feared warlord General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as “Hemedti,” is a central figure in the conflict that has ravaged Sudan since 2023. Starting from nothing, this ruthless and lawless militiaman managed to climb the political ranks and became one of the country’s richest men, thanks mainly to his brutality and alliances with regional powers.
Born in 1974 to a Mahariya Arab Rizeigat family from Darfur and Chad, Hemedti grew up among nomadic herders. His background of social exclusion allowed him to build a reputation as a defender of the poor and marginalized against Khartoum’s elites—but his entire path has been marked by ethnic violence.
In 2003, during the first Darfur war, he joined the Janjaweed, a pro-government militia tasked with attacking non-Arab populations. The group became infamous for massacres, rapes, and forced displacements. Hemedti distinguished himself by his ruthless efficiency, quickly rising to commander and then chief. Due to these “successes,” he was promoted to general. In 2013, in an attempt to clean up the Janjaweed’s image, President Omar al-Bashir rebranded the group as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). At their head, Hemedti controlled not only Darfur’s territories but also its riches—gold mines, gum Arabic, and livestock.
A rise through terror
In 2015, as a Saudi and UAE-led coalition declared war on Yemen’s Houthis, Hemedti sent thousands of Sudanese fighters, mostly from the RSF, to fight alongside the Gulf monarchies. This brought him massive political and financial support, as well as closer alliances with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, whose petrodollars flowed into his coffers. His mercenary ventures gave him international stature; he traveled to African and Arab capitals, negotiated migration and border controls with Western diplomats, building the image of a potential head of state. Despite all the fighters and resources provided to the RSF by the Gulf coalition, the Houthis eventually won after suffering immense losses, destruction, and famine. But by then, Hemedti was already at the gates of power in Khartoum.
Frankenstein in Khartoum
When mass protests destabilized the Sudanese regime, the army overthrew al-Bashir in April 2019. General al-Burhan, chief of the regular military, led the transitional council, with Hemedti—leader of a private army—as his number two. The seeds of chaos were sown. In June 2019, during peaceful demonstrations demanding a civilian government, the RSF acted ruthlessly: dispersing sit-ins with tear gas and live bullets, spreading terror and devastation. NGO reports detailed rapes, bodies dumped in the river, and at least 130 deaths that day. Days earlier, during pro-democracy protests, Hemedti had ominously warned, “My patience with politics has limits.”
After the massacre, political scientist Sarra Majdoub published an article in Orient XXI titled “Frankenstein in Khartoum,” predicting that Hemedti would remain a threat, even if the military held onto power. She warned he could turn into a Frankenstein’s monster, destroying hopes for a new Sudan and seizing power for himself, even against those who created him.
The Emiratis’ decisive support
That is exactly what happened. On April 15, 2023, the two generals went to war. While al-Burhan’s forces have their own failings, Hemedti’s fighters embarked on a campaign of destruction. Khartoum was set ablaze, civilians fled mostly to Egypt if they could, and those who stayed endured militia abuses. The war then spread nationwide, with the same tragic pattern—massacres, rapes, and displacement. Hemedti, the former herder-turned-billionaire, could not have fought Sudan’s regular forces without powerful backing.
While Saudi Arabia sided with Sudan’s government, the UAE gave the RSF substantial diplomatic, financial, military, and logistical support. Even so, Hemedti has lost significant ground, including all of Khartoum. For months, he’s been preparing a strategic retreat to Darfur, which he mostly still controls except for the regional capital, El-Fasher. Now he’s banking on turning his western stronghold—now the new epicenter of Sudan’s conflict—into his last bastion, launching massive attacks against civilians and camps like Zamzam. This approach risks repeating the partition logic that once split South Sudan from the country. Is Hemedti acting purely for survival, or still at the behest of the UAE? Regardless, his name is now inseparable from Sudan’s tragic history.
