After more than a decade of strained relations, Egypt and Turkey are moving toward a pragmatic re-engagement shaped less by reconciliation than by converging regional interests. Recent diplomatic exchanges and concrete defense-industrial cooperation suggest that both states now see more value in managed coordination than in prolonged rivalry, even as deep sources of mistrust remain unresolved.
The most tangible signal of this shift is a newly concluded defense and industrial cooperation agreement between Ankara and Cairo. Under the arrangement, Turkey’s state-owned Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKE) will export its TOLGA short-range air defense system to Egypt and help establish ammunition production facilities on Egyptian territory. The package includes infrastructure for manufacturing 155mm artillery ammunition as well as 7.62mm and 12.7mm small-arms ammunition, embedding a degree of long-term industrial cooperation rather than a one-off arms sale. Such agreements are difficult to separate from broader political intent, particularly given their timing alongside a high-level presidential visit.
This development follows years in which bilateral relations were defined by political rupture rather than transactional engagement. After 2013, diplomatic ties deteriorated sharply, with Turkey adopting positions perceived in Cairo as interference in Egypt’s internal affairs. Political estrangement was reinforced by regional competition, divergent alignments in Libya, disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, and sharply opposed views on political Islam. These disagreements created a durable atmosphere of suspicion that limited cooperation even where interests overlapped.
Over time, however, regional conditions shifted. Egypt consolidated its internal position and reasserted itself as a central actor across multiple regional files, including Libya, Gaza, Red Sea security, and Eastern Mediterranean energy discussions. Turkey, meanwhile, faced growing strategic constraints stemming from economic pressures, recalibrated relations with Gulf states, and the limits of confrontation-driven regional policies. As priorities evolved, neither side found sustained benefit in continued diplomatic standoff, and Israel’s expanding footprint in Gaza and the Eastern Mediterranean added an additional incentive for Cairo and Ankara to explore more coordinated approaches to regional crises.
The current rapprochement does not reflect a comprehensive resolution of past disputes. Rather, it appears to be driven by selective alignment where interests clearly converge. Defense cooperation, trade expansion, and investment frameworks offer practical gains without requiring full political convergence. From Ankara’s perspective, rebuilding working relations with Cairo helps rebalance its regional posture and reduce isolation in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. For Cairo, engagement with Turkey offers leverage, diversification of defense partnerships, and a mechanism to manage regional competition through dialogue rather than escalation.
Sensitive political and security issues nonetheless remain embedded in the relationship. Among them are concerns related to cross-border political activity, media operations, and the broader question of non-interference in domestic affairs. While not publicly detailed, such matters are widely understood to be central to trust-building and are likely being handled incrementally rather than through public agreements. Their resolution, or lack thereof, will shape how far rapprochement can progress beyond tactical cooperation.
Beyond bilateral concerns, both states face overlapping external pressures. Energy security, maritime navigation, regional conflicts, and supply-chain resilience are increasingly interconnected challenges. Coordination, even if limited, offers practical advantages in managing these pressures. The defense-industrial component of the relationship is particularly notable in this respect, as it ties cooperation to long-term production capacity rather than symbolic diplomacy.
Looking ahead, the trajectory of Egyptian-Turkish relations is unlikely to be linear. The current phase suggests managed normalization rather than strategic alignment. Progress will depend on whether political engagement continues to translate into operational coordination and whether outstanding sources of mistrust are contained rather than inflamed by regional crises. What is clear is that both states now appear more inclined to test cooperation than to sustain open hostility.
