By Arezki Daoud: Egypt’s recent posture toward Somalia and Sudan reflects a clear strategic doctrine that is no longer implicit. Cairo is signaling that state collapse along its southern and southeastern arc is unacceptable, not as a matter of ideology, but as a matter of national survival.
In Somalia, Egypt’s expanded military engagement following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland marks a shift from counterterrorism support to regime and state preservation. Cairo’s calculation is that a fragmented Somalia creates space for external powers to reshape access to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, with direct implications for Egyptian maritime security.
Somaliland’s geography matters more than its internal governance record. Its position along the Gulf of Aden places it at the intersection of global shipping lanes and regional military competition. From Cairo’s perspective, recognition of a breakaway authority is not a neutral diplomatic act. It is a precedent that could accelerate state fragmentation and invite foreign basing arrangements under the guise of bilateral cooperation.
These concerns intersect directly with Egypt’s unresolved dispute with Ethiopia over Nile water governance. Any alignment that strengthens Ethiopia’s strategic depth, whether through port access or external security partnerships, weakens Egypt’s already constrained leverage. Obviously, for a country that depends on the Nile for nearly all of its freshwater, this is treated as an existential issue, not a negotiable one.
Sudan fits into the same strategic logic. Cairo’s firm rejection of any fragmentation, parallel authorities, or militia-based governance in Sudan reflects fear of a cascading collapse on its southern border in the same way Egypt has been concerned about Libya on its western border. A failed Sudan would export instability into the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea basin, and Egypt’s own western and southern security environment, just as the collapse of Libya accelerated the disintegration of the Sahel. The language used by Egypt’s foreign minister leaves little ambiguity. Sudan’s unity is a red line, and Cairo is prepared to act if it perceives that line being crossed.
What ties Somalia and Sudan together is Egypt’s broader concern with state erosion across Africa’s northeastern corridor. Cairo is not positioning itself as an ideological arbiter or regional hegemon. It is acting as a status quo power defending recognized borders, centralized authority, and predictable security arrangements in a region where fragmentation has become normalized.
This approach will not be cost-free. Military commitments, diplomatic friction, and competing external actors all raise the risk profile. But Egypt appears to have concluded that the cost of inaction is higher. In both Somalia and Sudan, Cairo is betting that preserving imperfect states is preferable to managing the strategic fallout of their collapse. Whether this strategy stabilizes the region or deepens geopolitical competition remains uncertain. What is clear is that Egypt has moved from quiet concern to explicit positioning. Its red lines are now on the table, and regional actors are being warned accordingly.
