In this latest brief podcast, MEA Risk’s Arezki Daoud addresses the issues of instability and security in the Sahel, focusing on the impact of Covid-19 pandemic, the insurgency and how government forces are magnifying the crisis in the sub-region. This podcast was recorded on 29 May 2020.
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Transcript:
Up until now, the Sahel region appears to have dodged the bullet, with the impact of the Coronavirus being extremely minimal. Although the five main Sahelian countries have no capacity to properly identify how many Covid-19 cases there are, the number of people who died from the virus may be a better indicator, though likely not comprehensive or complete. Collectively, the countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania recorded 273 deaths from the virus as of the 28th of May 2020. In contrast, the four countries of the north, that is Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, collectively lost 1,725 people to the virus, or six times more than the Sahel. This comparison may be a bit unfair considering the difference in population sizes, so it is better to normalize the data by translating into the number of deaths per one million people. On average, the Sahel shows 3.6 deaths per one million people, with each of the five Sahelian country showing between 3 and 4 deaths per one million. In the north, the average for the four countries combined is double that of the Sahel at 6.2 per million, where each country appears to have different profiles. Tunisian fared the best at a death rate of 4 per one million, essentially matching the Sahel, while Algeria shows the worst performance at an alarming 14 per one million, about the top 3 or 4 in the entire Africa continent.
For now, Mauritania appears to be the least affected country in the entire northern half of the continent. Only 19 people were reported to have died from the virus as of the 18th of May. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what led to such a low number, but the fact that the country’s borders are not easy to cross, may have impacted the infection rates.
While the public health crisis that crippled the world is having very limited impact on the Sahel, that region, sadly, faces unprecedented security challenges, heightening the instability that could further deteriorate going forward. One of the many sources of instability are the plethora of Jihadi groups that have been wrecking having in the region. The latest news now is that there is an ongoing bitter war between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group for the territorial control of the Sahel. This conflict marks the possible end of cooperation between the two in what could be an escalation of violence in the weeks and months to come, but local analysts warn not to jump to conclusion as the two rivals could find new ways to collaborate. On the ground, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations have reorganized under a coordinating alliance called GSIM.
For years, the two have been coordinating some of their actions, even using each other’s fighters. The first signs of a conflict between them began early this year, starting with minor skirmishes and then escalating into major confrontation in particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. Among the causes of what appears to be full-blown war we are seeing in the Sahel may be the change in the top leadership of the Islamic State after IS announced its new chief, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, who replaced Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. That likely spurred the need for Islamic State to ascertain itself. After suffering defections of many of its fighters, including the ethnic Fulanis, in favor of IS, the GSIM allegedly “started a war” against the Caliphate, according to accusations published by an Islamic State weekly media outlet, Al-Naba.
Another reason for the worsening relations between Al Qaeda and IS is the difficulty these two groups are facing in procuring food and crops needed to feed their fighters. A Malian expert told AFP that the dry season tend to start with violent clashes among insurgent groups in central Mali over a fodder crop grown in the Niger river delta, called bourgou. The region has seen intense fighting over its control, spiking this year after Islamic State fighters moved into the central Mali region, challenging the local al-Qaeda affiliate known as Katiba Macina or the Macina platoon. There were reports of 60 insurgents killed in mid-March in central Mali and possibly 35 GSIM fighters in Burkina Faso near the Mali border in late April.
On 7 May, Al-Naba recognized that there was a conflict in the region, where “several dozen” fighter died in April. The month of May appears to have seen some truce put in place, most likely due to the month of Ramadan. The truce, if any, appears to be holding as we enter the month of June.
While the future of the relationship between the two remains unpredictable, as they can resume their cooperation based on changing circumstances on the ground, each group is taking strong position wherever they can. In Gourma, GSIM seems to have taken the advantage there. It has been logistically supported by a local Katiba, reinforced by a few former combatants from the now-defunct West African affiliate of al-Qaeda known as Mujao, enabling GSIM to regain control of this highly disputed area.
The fiercest battle was said to have taken place in mid-April at Ndaki, 65 km east of Gossi, where a large number of GSIM combatants reportedly attacked IS. The latter claimed to have turned the situation around using suicide bombers, but local sources say the area remains under GSIM control.
Similar fights were reported in Nampala, near the Mauritanian border, and in Segou, east of Macina. In March, more clashes were reported near the Mauritanian border, in Fassala (where GSIM defections for IS were reported earlier this year) and in early April, in the Mopti region. Al-Naba says GSIM assaults were repelled and reported the killing of more than 35 opposing fighters south of Boulikessi.
In Liptako Gourma in Mali and in Burkina Faso, ISIS attacked GSIM fighters near Tin-Tabakat in mid-April. In the provinces of Soum and the Oudalan province of Burkina Faso, more fighting was reported during the same period. In Belehedé, in Soum, IS used roadside bombs on GSIM convoy, killing several people. More of the same sort of attacks and counter attacks were reported elsewhere.
Islamic State has also launched propaganda attacks against Al-Qaeda, accusing it of serving the interests of France and its allies. It even accused Al-Qaeda of having negotiated a deal with the Malian government to secure the borders with Algeria and Mauritania, directly attacking Qaeda leaders Iyad Ag Ghaly and Amadou Koufa.
But the populations of the Sahel are not just experiencing mayhem from terror groups. They are also facing brutal government forces that use summary executions and are known to be behind enforced or involuntary disappearances. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali or MINUSMA calculates that human rights violations abuses in Mali rose by a stunning 61.21% on the sequential basis in the first quarter of this year, to 598. The death toll from violent incidents in that quarter reached 380 people, including children and women. Most of the murders the took place in Mopti in the center of Mali and in Segou, halfway between Mopti and the capital Bamako in the south. The violence there has been the result of communal fights between ethnic Fulanis and Dogons, but then there has been an increase in attacks and violations from the defense and security forces. Although most of the killings and abuses can be traced to insurgents and communal conflicts, including the alleged involvement of the Touareg groups knowns as the Coordination of the Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad, the Minusma recognizes that the region’s defense forces have caused tremendous harm. In a report, Minusma noted “the increasing involvement of the Malian Defense and Security Forces in human rights violations”, in particular in the Center of the country. Extrajudicial executions are increasing (101 victims in the first quarter), in the circle of Niono and in the circle of Douentza. Elements of the Malian forces, some of whom operating under the aegis of the G5 Sahel, have also been responsible for multiple human rights violations, including 18 cases of arbitrary executions”. Minusma reported 34 extrajudicial executions in the hands of the armed forces of Niger, which took place in the first quarter in Inekar, Chinagodar, and elsewhere.
So in conclusion, the Coronavirus may be the lesser problem facing the populations of the Sahel. There is simply no leadership able to put forward and implement a plan to restore some stability. Governments there are in disarray and foreign governments, France in particular, have no appetite in imposing a solution that would bring stability. In fact, with the Covid-19 crisis affecting France so badly, it remains to be seen how this will impact France’s posture in the region in the long run. What is certain, is that the Jihadi groups have not shown any clear sign of retraction or hit the pause button. They are likely to escalate their attacks, even if they are divided and may continue to fight each other.
Until our next podcast, thank you for listening.
